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Rereading the “One Share, One Vote”
Principle:
Is It Also a Matter of Competition?
Federico Ghezzi,* Chiara Mosca† & Maria Lucia Passador‡
Despite being a cumbersome principle of corporate governance, the “one share,
one vote” principle à la Easterbrook and Fischel is constantly challenged by several
attempts to circumvent the original structure of capitalism democracy, based on the
provision (often a default provision) that no more and no less than one vote is attributed to each share.
The possibility of adopting categories of shares with multiple voting rights and
that of resorting to mechanisms that multiply voting rights upon the occurrence of
specific conditions (oftentimes linked to a loyalty bonus for long-term shareholders),
depends on the articles of association’s autonomy granted to joint-stock companies.
Rigidly adopting the one share one vote principle de facto entails limiting such autonomy, and where not arising from the applicable regulations, such a limitation
can be required by the listing market rules.
And it is precisely the advisability of such exceptions—which Easterbrook and
Fischel would have strongly refuted—that is the subject of the current debate in both
Europe and the United States.
Our paper attempts to examine the arguments put forward by those who do
not condemn the tool of shares with multiple voting rights, either by issuing class
shares or by awarding bonus mechanisms that enhance votes per share. On a closer
look, the current debate highlights, even for listed companies, the benefits deriving
from stable control and from strengthening those shareholders who are interested in
long-term results. Nevertheless, as Easterbrook and Fischel would have stated, the
need to protect the minority shareholders lingers in the background, as does the issue
of when and to what extent these shareholders can express their views on the choice
of the company in which they have invested to derogate from the “one share, one vote”
principle.
This is the reason for the interest in the Italian case, which is noteworthy both
for the risks and the peculiarities of its shareholding corporate structure (and its
effect on the increase of the voting right) and for the interesting and singular report
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that the Antitrust Authority sent to the Prime Minister last year, advising on the use
of multiple voting shares as a tool even for (already) listed companies.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The debate over whether stock corporations should be provided with multiple voting shares has not been nearly as lively as
it is today. Historically, the application of the “one share, one
vote” rule has been considered an expression of an implicit principle of shareholder democracy. In a context in which only the
number of shares held allows for a multiplication of voting rights,
this principle corresponds, in fact, to a rigid proportionality between risk and power. The risk is represented by the size of the
capital investment in the company, while the power corresponds
to the ability to affect the decisions taken at the general shareholder meeting and, therefore, the appointment of the board of
directors. Since company law entrusts directors with the corporate management and strategic choices, after all, the market is
called upon to assess the results of such an entrepreneurial
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activity. The market enjoys a deterring power to the extent that,
when facing the share price depreciation—which is considered a
sign of inadequate managerial choices—it may be advisable to
foster market acquisitions aimed at changing control. For this
reason, numerous studies of law and economics have always highlighted the power of the market of control as a device to replace
non-performing directors through successful hostile takeovers.
The discussion therefore shifted from company law to financial
markets law: a strong tie to the one share one vote principle was
seen as the essential tool underlying the functioning of the market for corporate control.
But plenty of water has passed under the bridge. Careful considerations have been advanced—from several points of view, in
Europe as well as in the United States—with regard to the benefits of regulatory choices increasingly departing from the one
share one vote principle. On both shores of the Atlantic, the absence of an express prohibition on providing shares with multiple
voting rights has made it possible to make room for some corporate law experiments, sometimes reflected in the bylaws of listed
companies. More precisely, in Europe, the absence of a common
rule on the issue granted member states discretion in this matter,
offering an example of regulatory competition between countries:
some of them were capable of attracting companies on the premise of more discretion in drawing up share categories, depending
precisely on the number of voting rights they award. In fact, exceptions to the one share one vote principle do not always involve
the creation of share classes since in some cases, following the
French tradition, tenure voting rights are attributed as a bonus
to shareholders who prove their loyalty to the investment (usually
shown by the uninterrupted holding of shares for a prolonged
time period, as set out in the bylaws) without the need to create
share classes with tenure voting rights.
Besides regulatory competition issues, since it is not fully
proven that flexibility in terms of shares is, by itself, sufficient to
push companies to relocate their corporate headquarters, the proponents of multiple voting shares stress the importance of this
mechanism in convincing reluctant entrepreneurs to bring companies to the market. Particularly in the European context, populated by small and medium-sized companies, mostly with family
shareholders, it has been claimed that multiple voting share classes would protect the founder from losing control of the company
by going public. At a policy level, increasing the number of IPOs
is a desirable outcome insofar as it allows companies to grow and
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be more competitive in global markets. The Capital Markets Union’s push towards the development of European markets (including both the regulated market and other recognized trading platforms) is the origin of growing favor towards greater flexibility in
the field (also raising the European issue of harmonization in this
respect).
Indeed, multiple voting rights constitute, for all intents and
purposes, a control-enhancing mechanism, albeit a more transparent one than those widely used by companies in continental
Europe.1 Therefore, it is surprising that little attention has been
paid so far to the influences that company law has on the complex
mechanisms of financial markets law. In Europe, the obligation
of a takeover bid when thresholds (measured in terms of voting
rights) are exceeded imposes an implied limit on the adoption of
multiple voting rights by listed companies with a strong shareholder base who might enjoy an above-threshold percentage of
voting rights thanks to said vote-enhancing instruments. Therefore, from this standpoint, multiple voting rights would seem to
be particularly suitable for unlisted companies planning to file for
IPOs, a process that can be approached with a predefined set of
shares that will enable companies to raise capital without sacrificing a stable control.
In the framework of the above-mentioned extensive debate,
this Article is structured as follows: after an examination of the
main characteristics of the US legal system and the European
scenario in this area (Section II), attention focuses on the Italian
scenario. This scenario is characterized, as is known, by a peculiar shareholding composition but also by an unusual incursion of
the Antitrust Authority into the law of financial markets: in a report dated March 23, 2021, in fact, it proposed to allow recourse
to the instrument of multi-voting shares for companies that are
already listed (Section III). This approach aims to increase flexibility in our country with respect to multiple-vote shares (Section
IV) since the mechanism at stake is an antidote to short-termism
(Section V), but the approach must also be assessed through the
eyes of institutional investors, who provide valuable resources for
the growth of companies and in light of the ownership of Italian
companies (Section VI). The conclusion thus attempts to imagine
Easterbrook and Fischel as jurists of 2022, in a profoundly
1
See, e.g., INST. S’HOLDER SERVS. ET AL., REPORT ON THE PROPORTIONALITY
PRINCIPLE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (Nov. 11, 2016); Ettore Croci, Controlling-Enhancing
Mechanisms: Loyalty Shares and Multiple-Voting Shares in Italy (June 2018)
(unpublished manuscript), https://perma.cc/C2R5-SEPY.
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changed environment, untangling between pros and cons, between European and US views, between shareholder democracy
and market instances (Section VII).
II. A COMPARATIVE VIEW OF MULTIPLE VOTING AND LOYALTY
SHARES (TENURE VOTING RIGHTS)
A. The US Experience
Despite the rather continued use of dual-class shares in the
US, their existence has been subject, throughout the years, to several amendments and divergent approaches. In the mid-nineteenth century, three major structures were used in US corporations’ articles of association. The rule of one share one vote, which
could be adopted (thus making control rights proportional to cash
flow rights), was not the only system allowed. In fact, one vote per
shareholder could also be prescribed (regardless of the number of
shares held); quite often, the voting rights of large shareholders
were limited with a maximum number of votes for each individual
shareholder. Only in 1852 did Maryland’s first general incorporation statute adopt the modern standard of one vote per share.2 In
1909, New York’s General Business Corporation Law entitled
each shareholder to one vote per share “[u]nless otherwise provided in the certificate of incorporation.”3
If we move to the modern history of US equity markets, traditionally the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) did not list companies with dual-class voting, in line with an ideological commitment to corporate democracy and accountability. Such a rigorous
ban—which was in force from 1940 until 1986—not only involved
multiple voting shares but also non-voting stocks.
In the midst of the takeover battles of the 1980s, it became
clear that multiple voting rights could reduce companies’ vulnerability to takeovers; the context was ideal to put forward the

2
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Understanding Dual Class Stock Part I: An Historical
Perspective, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Sept. 9, 2017), https://perma.cc/GU4X-CZE6; cf.
JOSEPH S. DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF AMERICAN CORPORATIONS 324,
340–41 (Harvard Univ. Press, 1912); Samuel Williston, History of the Law of Business
Corporations Before 1800 (Part II), 2 HARV. L. REV. 149, 156–57 (1888); Jeffrey Kerbel, An
Examination of Nonvoting and Limited Voting Common Stock: Their History, Legality and
Validity, 15 SEC. REG. L.J. 37, 47 (1987); David L. Ratner, The Government of Business
Corporations: Critical Reflections on the Rule of “One Share, One Vote,” 56 CORNELL L.
REV. 1, 9–11 (1970); Williams H.S. Stevens, Stockholders’ Voting Rights and the
Centralization of Voting Control, 40 Q.J. ECON. 353, 354 (1926).
3
1909 N.Y. Laws, ch. 28, § 23, reprinted in JOSEPH A. ARNOLD, NEW YORK BUSINESS
CORPORATIONS 39 (4th ed. 1911).
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discussion for more liberal rules on shareholder voting rights attached to each share. So—partly due to competitive pressure from
“the more libertarian Nasdaq”4—the NYSE and Amex relented to
this and filed a request with the SEC to modify their listing requirements by allowing dual-class structures, albeit not without
subsequent reconsideration that led to the introduction of some
limitations in later years.5
Taking a look at the numbers over the last few years,
“[b]etween 2005 and 2015, the number of US companies with dual
class share structures increased by 44 percent. . . . The prevalence of dual class share structures has further increased since
then: according to one measure, more than 20 percent of the companies listing shares on US exchanges between 2017 and 2019
had a dual class structure.”6
In assessing the legitimacy and the convenience of allowing a
corporation to deviate from the one share one vote rule, a distinction still exists between listed and unlisted companies. If, for unlisted companies, the choice is a matter of the articles of association, for US listed companies, regulation is strongly linked to the
listing rules, which do not favor the inclusion of multiple voting
rights and tenure voting clauses in the articles of association for
already listed companies (similar limitations can exist only if already provided in the articles of association before the IPO).
Supporters of multiple voting structures believe that they can
be beneficial, at least for a defined period of time. In this perspective, a dual-class structure insulates entrepreneurs from shortterm pressure and allows them to engage in long-term strategies
and business innovation. The underlying assumption is that
short-term incentives prevail if managers are at the mercy of
daily stock market pressure.
4
Marco Ventoruzzo, The Disappearing Taboo of Multiple Voting Shares: Regulatory
Responses to the Migration of Chrysler-Fiat 4 & n.14 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Law
Working Paper No. 288/2015, 2015) (citing to S.M. Bainbridge, The Short Life and Resurrection of SEC Rule 19C–4, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 565, 576 (1991)).
5
Id. at 5.
6
Comm. on Cap. Mkt. Regul., The Rise of Dual Class Shares: Regulation and Implication 2–3, 2 n.4 (Apr. 2020) (citing to Inv. Advisory Comm., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n,
Dual Class and Other Entrenching Governance Structures in Public Companies 1 & Figure 1 (Feb. 27, 2018), https://perma.cc/7ZDF-KZUD); see also Paul H. Edelman et al., Will
Tenure Voting Give Corporate Managers Lifetime Tenure? 24–25, 25 n.105 (Eur. Corp.
Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 384/2018, 2018), https://perma.cc/PT74-XB6H
(“[T]welve publicly-listed companies . . . adopted tenure voting between 1985 and 1987,
during the brief window after the NYSE abolished mandatory one share/one vote and before the current NYSE rule barring adoption of tenure voting post-IPO, and which still
remained on the NYSE.”); cf. Lynne L. Dallas & Jordan M. Barry, Long-Term
Shareholders and Time-Phased Voting, 40 Del. J. Corp. L. 541, 548, 552 (2016).
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According to Gilson and Gordon, “[a] significant number of
technology companies have gone public with dual class common
stock, on the contention that the current corporate governance
framework with single class common is insufficiently protective
of the company’s ability to innovate and to pursue a founder’s ‘idiosyncratic vision’ that may not be appreciated by the market.”7
It is assumed that the founder’s capacity can beat the overall performance of a very well-resourced board, composed of highly motivated directors, able to credibly monitor managerial strategy
and operational tasks.8
Clearly enough, the drawbacks of the approach in favor of
multiple voting shares emerge when the founder loses her irreplaceable capacity and insight, as well as dedication and longterm view.9
It is worth noting that dual-class structures, once adopted,
should last forever. The empirical evidence shows that nearly half
of the companies who went public with dual-class structures over
the last fifteen years in the US gave corporate insiders outsized
voting rights in perpetuity.10
7
Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Board 3.0 – An Introduction, 74 BUS. LAW.
351, 360 n.18 (2019); see also Zohar Goshen & Assaf Hamdani, Corporate Control and
Idiosyncratic Vision, 125 YALE L.J. 560 (2016) (recounting the theory about idiosyncratic
vision).
8
Gilson & Gordon, supra note 7, at 353.
9
See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Kobi Kastiel, The Untenable Case for Perpetual DualClass Stock, 103 VA. L. REV. 585 (2017); Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and
Corporate Governance: Complicating the Comparative Taxonomy, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1641
(2006); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Dual Class Common Stock: An Issue of Public and Private Law,
CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Jan. 2, 2019), https://perma.cc/62WH-J8BF; see also Dhruv
Aggarwal et al., The Rise Of Dual-Class Stock IPOs 1 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst.,
Finance Working Paper No. 806/2021, 2021), https://perma.cc/98ZM-AUHR (confirming
that “founders’ wedge is greater when founders have stronger bargaining power. The
increase in founder control over time is due to greater availability of private capital and
technological shocks that reduced firms’ needs for external financing. Stronger bargaining
power is also associated with a lower likelihood of sunset provisions that terminate dualclass structures”).
10 Robert J. Jackson Jr., Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech at the
University of California, Berkeley, School of Law: Perpetual Dual-Class Stock: The Case
Against Corporate Royalty (Feb. 15, 2018), https://perma.cc/33KX-677L; see Jinhee Kim et
al., Multi-Class Shares Around the World: The Role of Institutional Investors 2 (Nov. 2018)
(unpublished manuscript), https://perma.cc/8DFY-CCD7 (“The U.S. equity market has
historically been the paradigm of the ‘one-share one-vote’ model, but this has been
changing in the past decades with the trend of technology companies tapping markets
while limiting the voting rights of public shareholders.”); id. at 2 n.3 (“The NYSE
historically prohibited multi-class structures but, after AMEX allowed voting ratios of up
to 10:1 in 1976, it allowed low-vote shares in 1985 and, in 1994, it permitted non-voting
shares if these exist prior to going public.”); id. at 2 (“Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2010)
documented that only 6% of U.S. publicly-listed firms had dual-class share structures in
2002. However, over the last decade, more than 15% of companies that went public had
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However, also the opportunity to counterbalance short
termism by allowing multiple voting structures has been supported by some empirical data. According to the New York Stock
Exchange, between 1960 and 1980, the average holding period of
public company stocks ranged from about three to five years. It
then significantly declined in the early 1980s in correspondence
to the rise of the takeover boom, falling by 1990 to about two
years, and by the mid-2000s, it was less than a year. Currently,
the average holding period for individual stocks across all US
markets is about seventeen weeks. In these decades, the ownership of stocks by institutional investors increased from between 7
and 8 percent in 1950 to 67 percent in 2010. Such a decline in
holding periods for large investors (mutual funds, institutional
investors, and activist hedge funds) has been cited in support of
claims that shareholder pressure is forcing companies to take
short-term actions to the detriment of investment and growth.11
One possible remedy, as an alternative to the dual-class structure
(whose main feature is perpetuity of its characteristics), has been
envisaged in the adoption of tenure voting as a premium in terms
of voting rights awarded to the most loyal and long-term shareholders. Tenure voting can be subject to a sunset clause or (as in
the European model) could lapse when the underlying shares are
sold.
1. Tenure voting as something in-between
Dual-class stocks (also defined as “unequal shares”12) therefore provoke a strong hostility among shareholders, which would
be mitigated by the use of a time-phased voting system (also
known as tenure voting). This system rewards shareholders not
on the grounds of pre-acquired positions, but according to the period of time in which they will retain their stakes. Time-phased
voting systems were used by only a few companies in the recent
past of the US,13 while they are extensively examined and often
multiple classes of shares (Ritter (2017)). Multi-class shares have featured in high-profile
IPOs such as Google (2004), Facebook (2012), Square (2015), and the recent issuance of
non-voting shares by Snap (2017). These IPOs have attracted much debate, from both
regulators and market participants.”).
11 On the average holding period trends, see David J. Berger et al., Tenure Voting
and the U.S. Public Company, 76 BUS. LAW. 295, 298–300 (2017).
12 James
Surowiecki, Unequal Shares, NEW YORKER (May 28, 2012),
https://perma.cc/8PC7-QNGG.
13 Berger et al., supra note 11, at 16–17 (“A recent study identifies twelve U.S.
companies that used tenure voting in the last 30 years. Of these twelve, seven no longer
have tenure voting plans. The companies’ primary reasons for adopting tenure voting were
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used in Europe.14 Resurrecting this technique from the 80s would
mean building “a bulwark against short-termers who roam the
markets” with several implications: settling differences and concerns of both sides, thereby allowing a company to benefit not only
from the presence of its founders and rewarding long-term holders (by giving them more say in the corporate decisions than
short-term hedge fund activists who may favor short-term profits
over long-term goals)15 but also from the valuable long-term support of its investors.16
Tenure voting represents a middle ground for corporate managers and investors;17 while it does not guarantee control as dualclass structures do, it permits managers to “maintain control of
the company even in the face of an attempted change of control
transaction by a highly motivated dissident shareholder.”18 In the
meantime, institutional investors see it as a device granting
greater corporate governance rights and financial incentives over
time, in case the investors are engaged enough to retain a substantial stake in the company.19

to ‘decrease the influence of short-term investors’ and ‘increase the relative influence of
long-term investors.’”).
14 For a comparison with double-voting shares, see INST. S’HOLDER SERVS. ET AL.,
supra note 1, at 11 (“Time-phased double voting shares resemble dual-class shares in that
they consolidate an incumbent’s control by favouring her in a control contest. But in
contrast to dual-class shares, they impair control transfers even when the incumbent is
willing to sell. The reason is that a sale of double voting shares dissipates their additional
votes.”).
15 See Dennis K. Berman, Seeking a Cure for Raging Corporate Activism, WALL ST.
J. (Mar. 17, 2015), https://perma.cc/ZGH6-J4SF; Cydney Posner, Is “Tenure Voting” a
Possible Cure for “Raging Corporate Activism”?, COOLEY PUBCO (Mar. 19, 2015),
https://perma.cc/AM8D-7D3P.
16 Pros and cons are detailed in the white paper by Berger et al., supra note 11, at
18–30.
17 Scott Kupor, Limit Dual-Class Share Structures Rather than Shun Them, FIN.
TIMES (Nov. 20, 2018), https://perma.cc/8N75-HXS2 (“We must stop seeing this battle between chief executives and institutional investors as a zero-sum game. Instead, let’s set
up a system that gives company leaders the chance to build long-term value and investors
a fair say in governance.”).
18 Paul H. Edelman et al., Will Tenure Voting Give Corporate Managers Lifetime
Tenure? (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 384/2018, 2018),
https://perma.cc/PT74-XB6H.
19 Id. (arguing that tenure voting has many pros, but it truly works only if managers
hold a substantial block of shares over time, while it does not work if long-term passive
institutional investors have a greater role in these companies’ corporate governance; its
two main drawbacks are the liquidity of trading markets and proxy plumbing, which
makes it difficult to decide whether it is really preferable compared to the dual-class stocks
system.).
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2. The brand-new long-term stock exchange to leave room
for dual voting rights
The issue deserves to be examined further, especially with
regard to a certain US state and to an interesting proposal involving tenure voting (or, rather, making it one of its distinctive hallmarks). We are talking about California, being well aware of its
pioneering role throughout the country and of the fact that as California goes, so goes the nation.
Corporations located in Silicon Valley traditionally delayed
focus on short-term earnings or profitability, trying to build foundations for their businesses that, in the future, might result in
valuable results (e.g., the commercialization of technologies) for
their owners over time. CEOs and boards believe that they will
benefit from being insulated from short-termism even when they
go public20 and call for protections to safeguard their long-term
thinking, which is necessary to foster innovation: “[W]hat’s happening in governance is somewhat at odds with that kind of DNA
and the challenge is where’s the balance going to be found.”21
The proposal to create a long-term stock exchange
(LTSE)—which was embraced by Asana and Twilio22—was initially put forward at the end of a book written by Eric Ries and
entitled The Lean Startup.23 Afterwards, the bestselling author

20 Panel Interview by Abe Friedman with Joseph Grundfest, William A Franke
Professor of L. & Bus., Stan. L. Sch., ICGN, Silicon Valley Boardrooms: Distinctive
Dynamics in Corporate Governance, https://perma.cc/9FG2-7Z6S (last visited Feb. 7,
2022) (“[I]f you look at Silicon Valley companies, the general ethos in the Valley is you
want to stay private for as long as you possibly can. One of the reasons why companies
want to stay private can [sic] is that the people in charge of building these companies
aren’t looking forward to doing business with public equity investors. . . . For an increasing
number of companies they’ll say we would rather be bought by Intel, or we’d rather be
bought by Facebook, we’d rather be bought by Google, than do an IPO on our own.
Founders in companies have a choice, people vote with their feet and what you’re seeing,
not only in Silicon Valley, but throughout the United States, is an increasing number of
entrepreneurs saying, it’s not worth it being public, given all of the fixed costs and all of
the governance hassles and everything else associated with that.”).
21 Id.
22 Companies, LONG TERM STOCK EXCH., https://perma.cc/WU3A-KX23; Declan
Harty, Silicon Valley’s Long Term Stock Exchange Finally Lists Its First Companies:
Twilio and Asana, FORTUNE (Aug. 26, 2010), https://perma.cc/3ZKT-DRXY. For the broker-dealers that are approved members of Long-Term Stock Exchange, see LONG TERM
STOCK EXCH., https://perma.cc/HR9P-BBKR (last visited July 7, 2022).
23 ERIC RIES, THE LEAN STARTUP: HOW TODAY’S ENTREPRENEURS USE CONTINUOUS
INNOVATION TO CREATE RADICALLY SUCCESSFUL BUSINESSES 282 (2011) (“Beyond simple
research, I believe our goal should be to change the entire ecosystem of entrepreneurship.
Too much of our startup industry has devolved into a feeder system for giant media
companies and investment banks. Part of the reason established companies struggle to
invest consistently in innovation is intense pressure from public markets to hit short-term
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concretely pursued the idea, bringing together engineers, finance
and legal experts, as well as investors in order to understand how
this can be achieved. This is intended to relieve the pressure of
the short-term stock market and shareholders on the CEOs of
publicly traded companies, thereby allowing them to focus on innovation instead.24
The plan has gradually gathered the consensus of capitalists
in Silicon Valley, precisely because of the presence of tenure voting. However, the project was initially met with skepticism: it
would be, according to its opponents, a way finalized exclusively
to the preservation of control to the detriment of other shareholders. It would be a tool “to duck accountability.”25
IEX Group Inc. was one of the first companies to announce
its partnership with the LTSE in December 2017 and formalized
its position through formal filing with the SEC on March 27,
2018.26 More specifically, Article 14A.412 proposed by IEX would
require LTSE Listings Issuers to assign a higher level of voting
rights to newly issued shares than the initial voting power of such
shares, since shares listed on LTSE Listings may accumulate additional voting rights (“long-term voting”) over time, as detailed
in the third Exhibit.
This was certainly a wonderful chance to discuss deviations
to the one share one vote principle, especially in light of the valuable contributions made by experts in the field. A key—though
quite predictable—view was expressed by the CEO of CalPERS,
the largest defined benefit plan public pension fund in the US
(i.e., a significant institutional investor with a long-term investment horizon), who strongly relies upon the integrity, stability,

profitability and growth targets. Mostly, this is a consequence of the accounting methods
we have developed for evaluating managers . . . . What is needed is a new kind of stock
exchange, designed to trade in the stocks of companies that are organized to sustain longterm thinking. I propose that we create a Long-Term Stock Exchange (LTSE).”).
24 Cultivating Enduring Value in the Public Markets, LONG TERM STOCK EXCH.,
https://perma.cc/Z8DS-KA6A (last visited Feb. 11, 2022).
25 Matt Levine, The Long-Term Stock Exchange Is Worth a Shot, BLOOMBERG (Oct.
16, 2017), https://perma.cc/P83Z-B2W4.
26 “Pursuant to the provisions of Section 19(b)(1) under the Act of 1934, and Rule
19b-4 thereunder, IEX is filing with the Commission a proposed rule change to establish
a new optional listing category on the Exchange, which provides a differentiated choice for
issuers and investors that prefer listing standards explicitly designed to promote longterm value creation.” Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change to Establish a New
Optional Listing Category on the Exchange, “LTSE Listings on IEX,” 83 Fed. Reg. 14,074
(proposed Apr. 2, 2018) (citations omitted); see also Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Exhibit 3 of
Release No. 34–8398 (Mar. 27, 2018), https://perma.cc/J4WR-UM4E; Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n, Exhibit 5 of Release No. 34–8398 (Mar. 27, 2018), https://perma.cc/RSF3-QUUW.
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and efficiency of the capital markets. In this respect, the CEO expressed herself as follows:
Listing standards explicitly designed to promote longterm value creation serve an important purpose in compelling sound corporate governance practices by publicly listed
companies. Key features of the Long-Term Stock Exchange
(LTSE’s) framework include: a long-term voting system and
new company disclosures focused on long-term growth strategy, human capital, executive compensation, auditing and
accounting, environmental impact, and diversity all of which
are vital to investment decision-making. These features are
meant to give long-term shareowners a greater role in a company’s corporate governance and to provide shareowners
with relevant information for evaluating long-term success.
In our view, more long-term thinking is needed in the
markets. To that end, we believe the long-term focus that will
be promoted through LTSE listing on IEX will help ensure
that company governance standards and policies are better
aligned with shareowner interests. Specifically, the longterm focus will serve the interests of long-standing shareowners by providing a mechanism by which key governance
issues are more transparent and subject to regular disclosure. We believe that the Proposal will help to capture various governance dimensions relevant to a long-term investor
such as CalPERS.27
Investors Exchange LLC shared the same view, and in their
response to the consultation, they largely referred to the comments made by Glass Lewis, which is generally in favor of the
creation of LTSE since it is an option, an innovative solution, to
bring long-term value to shareholders. Notwithstanding that Article 14A.413(b) does not seem to be consistent with Glass Lewis’s
view that “double-class” voting structures without alignment of
ownership and voting rights may be the cause of agency risks,
Glass Lewis acknowledges—and the observation is echoed by Investors Exchange LLC—that the proposal for the long-term voting structure of shareholders with voting rights may be preferable

27 Cal. Pub. Emp. Retirement Sys., Comment Letter on Notice of Filing of Proposed
Rule Change to Establish a New Optional Listing Category on the Exchange, “LTSE
Listings on IEX,” (Apr. 23, 2018), https://perma.cc/K3GS-XXZN.
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to some investors over the other unequal voting structures available.28
However, the balanced discussion that took place at the
roundtable also highlighted many of the drawbacks of loyalty
share structures as they currently exist in the market. These included arguments about reduced transparency, loyalty share
structures being more opaque and difficult to calculate, which creates an obstacle for securities lending (thereby making it difficult
for index funds to use them); the fact that control-enhancing
mechanisms can also protect incompetency, insulate management, and deter outside ideas; the fact that the registration practicalities in some existing structures can make immediate liquidity impossible; and that direct client ownership would be an issue
for institutional investors. In addition, regulators could decide to
prevent the largest institutional investors from taking up extra
voting power.29
Among the scholars who addressed the issue, Chris Brummer
participated in the consultation with a contribution of considerable interest: on the one hand, he reviewed the state-of-the-art in
terms of the position of both the market players and the authors
who addressed the issue; on the other hand, he analyzed the elements that make the LTSE Listings option a viable and distinct
alternative for market participants who favor a greater emphasis
on long-term value creation, identifying them in (i) long-term
growth strategies, (ii) transparency, (iii) long-term management
compensation, and (iv) long-term voting aligned with corporate
governance with long-term objectives of all stakeholders.30
28 Invs. Exch. LLC, Comment Letter on Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change to
Establish a New Optional Listing Category on the Exchange, “LTSE Listings on IEX,”
(Apr. 16, 2018), https://perma.cc/9X68-LR6G. In the sense of supporting the vision of the
“further option” it would offer in the investment landscape, see Aspen Inst., Comment
Letter on Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change to Establish a New Optional Listing
Category on the Exchange, “LTSE Listings on IEX,” (Apr. 23, 2018),
https://perma.cc/96WP-3QNF, and, although preferring and supporting single-class
shares, see also Inherent Grp., Comment Letter on Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule
Change to Establish a New Optional Listing Category on the Exchange, “LTSE Listings
on IEX,” (Apr. 19, 2018), https://perma.cc/8J8B-MRXV (“Finally, while we generally prefer
single-class share structures, we support mechanisms that reward long-term shareholders
with a greater say in corporate governance issues than short-term shareholders. However,
such mechanisms must maintain management accountability, preserve adequate liquidity
in the public markets, and balance the interests of small and large—and short-term and
long-term—shareholders.”).
29 Loyalty Shares: Limited Use Structure or Corporate Game Changer?, EUR. CORP.
GOVERNANCE INST. (Feb. 28, 2019), https://perma.cc/YAZ4-WA7B.
30 Chris Brummer, Professor, Georgetown U. L. Ctr., Comment Letter on Notice of
Filing of Proposed Rule Change to Establish a New Optional Listing Category on the
Exchange, “LTSE Listings on IEX,” (Apr. 22, 2018), https://perma.cc/G5D9-N8UL.
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Focusing our attention on the first point, it is worth stressing that
the LTSE listing rules require listed issuers to create a committee
specifically dedicated to overseeing the Issuer’s strategic plans for
long-term growth, which is also responsible for providing explicit
information on the growth strategy, thus providing shareholders
with information vital to understanding the policy in place.
While the positive comments led the SEC to be in favor of the
establishment of the LTSE,31 the SEC suspended under Rule
431(e) any decision pending compliance with the supplement to
the answer to the consultation proposed by Investor Exchange
LLC.32 The decision held on June 29, 2018, is therefore stayed
until the Commission orders otherwise. Unexpectedly, on August
15, 2018, IEX decided to abandon the project by formally
withdrawing its proposal to the SEC while continuing to support
the vision in the direction of long-termism.33
B. The “One Share, One Vote” Experience Outside the US: A
Race to Attract Start-Ups and Fast-Growing Firms
Even outside the United States, there has been an ongoing
swing between a pugnacious defense of the one share one vote
principle and positions that are more open to a greater
differentiation of voting rights.34 It is a well-known and widely
31 Letter from Brent J. Fields, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, to Sophia Lee, Gen.
Couns., Invs. Exch. LLC (June 29, 2018), https://perma.cc/LU4W-29F4.
32 For further notes on it, see Investors Exch. LLC, Comment Letter on Notice of
Filing of Proposed Rule Change to Establish a New Optional Listing Category on the
Exchange (June 27, 2018), https://perma.cc/4Z94-YTLX (attaching Amendment No. 1 to
the proposed rule change).
33 Investors Exch. LLC, Comment Letter on Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change
to Establish a New Optional Listing Category on the Exchange (Aug. 15, 2018),
https://perma.cc/UT96-NEY5 (withdrawing the proposed rule change); cf. Long-term
Investors, PRINCIPLES FOR RESPOSIBLE INV. (Aug. 31, 2018), https://perma.cc/EH2QMKGW; Nicole Bullock, IEX-LTSE Listings Partnership in Doubt, FORTUNE (Aug. 17,
2018), https://perma.cc/ZSM9-QN24.
34 At the EU level, we assisted to a very lively debate between experts, courts and
institutions on the principle of proportionality and, therefore, on the desirability of control
enhancing mechanisms, starting with the results of the High Level Group of Company
Law Experts. The High Level Group of Company Law Experts underlined in particular
the need for a harmonization of European company law around the “one share-one vote”
rule. A MODERN REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR COMPANY LAW IN EUROPE (Nov. 4, 2002),
https://perma.cc/QXU6-L4DM. Indirectly, this principle had also found some support in
the European case law on golden share, with the Court of Justice condemning the provisions of the Italian civil code allowing the State or public bodies to enjoy a power of control
disproportionate to the shareholding held privately. See Joined Cases C–463/04 &
C–0464/04, Federconsumatori v. Comune di Milano, 2007 E.C.R. I–10434. However, for an
example of other judgments on the principle of equal treatment which did not pose obstacles to the deviation from the one share one vote rule, see Case C–101/08, Audiolux SA v.
Groupe Bruxelles Lambert SA (GBL), 2009 E.C.R. I–09823. On this latter judgment, see
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discussed fact that the enthusiasm for the Holy Grail of one share
one vote,35 formulated in the Report of the High Level Group of
Companies Law Experts of January 2002 (also referred to as the
Winter Report),36 quickly subsided and faded.37 Recently, above all
because of the need to thwart the so-called short-termism, the
criticisms about it—or, more precisely, the openings in the
opposite direction—gradually led to the recognition and
appreciation of loyalty.38 The recent ECGI Roundtable at NYU
recognizes that the concept “is gaining traction in Europe with
the support of the European Commission,” but is also attracting
interest in the US, where “loyalty shares with ‘tenure voting’ or
‘time-phased voting’ have appeared in a small number of
companies and are included in the listing requirements for the
newly proposed ‘Long Term Stock Exchange.’” 39
The process of gradually opening up to loyalty shares and
multiple voting shares can be explained by resorting to the
paradigm of regulatory competition. In fact, looking at the
international context, since the early 2000s, there has been a
growing tolerance as to the possibility of listing the companies
which, in addition to ordinary shares, envisage shares with
tenure or multiple voting rights. From a time perspective, as

see Andrea Sacco Ginevri, The Rise of Long-Term Minority Shareholders’ Rights in Publicly Held Corporations and Its Effects on Corporate Governance, 12 EUR. BUS. ORG. L.
REV. 587 (2011), and Federico M. Mucciarelli, Equal Treatment of Shareholders and European Union Law, 7 EUR. COMP. FIN. L. REV. 165 (2010). Moreover, in 2007, the Report
on the Proportionality Principle in the European Union, prepared for the European Commission, highlights how the favor towards the “one share, one vote” principle has been
subject to rethinking, even given the lack of consistency in the rules throughout the various Member States and the underlying economic circumstances. Instead, in the most recent EU Commission’s Communication, Action Plan: European Company Law and Corporate Governance: A Modern Legal Framework for More Engaged Shareholders and
Sustainable Companies, COM (2012) 740 final (Dec. 12, 2012), and in the Green Paper on
long-term financing, Long-term Financing of the European Economy, COM (2013) 150 final (Mar. 25, 2013), the adoption of instruments to increase the vote and of categories of
shares with multiple votes has been encouraged in order to incentivize shareholders to
make long-term investments.
35 Viviane de Beaufort, One share-One vote, le nouveau Saint Graal (ESSEC Bus.
Sch., Working Paper No. DR06019, 2006).
36 Jaap W. Winter et al., Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on
Issues Related to Takeover Bids in the European Union, in GUIDO FERRARINI ET AL.,
REFORMING COMPANY AND TAKEOVER LAW IN EUROPE, ANNEX 2, 825–924 (Oxford Univ.
Press, 2004).
37 Guido Ferrarini, One Share – One Vote: A European Rule? (Eur. Corp. Governance
Inst., Law Working Paper No. 58/2006, 2006), https://perma.cc/8BYT-WZCH.
38 Piergaetano Marchetti & Chiara Mosca, Note sparse sulle loyalty shares, 63 RIV.
SOC. 1549 (2018).
39 TOM VOS, EUR. CORP. GOVERNANCE INST., LOYALTY SHARES (Dec. 7, 2018),
https://perma.cc/HDP9-TV24 (referring to the speech held by Professor Becht).

172

The University of Chicago Business Law Review

[Vol. 1:157

already mentioned, this regulatory competition began in the
United States, thanks to the successful listing of some high-tech
companies, whose founders retained management power through
the issuance of unlisted categories of multiple voting shares
dedicated to them.40 Thus, even in Europe, the relocation of the
Fiat Group’s headquarters to the Netherlands, which provided
the possibility of having shares with a different voting power,41
prompted an amendment to the issuance of shares with multiple
and tenure voting rights.42 In the very same year, there was
internationally a common trend, heading in the same direction
albeit for different reasons: France—which was already
contemplating the possibility for listed companies to reward
shareholders with increased voting rights as part of a regulatory
scheme designed to protect the interests of both national
businessmen and workers—imposed tenure voting rights as the
default rule for listed companies. By this means, the aim to reduce
the potential obstacles to the approval of the amendments to the
bylaws for the adoption of such tenure voting shares could be
reached.43
40 Some companies, predominantly from the high-tech and media sectors, have
adopted dual-class structures prior to IPO (Meta Platforms (Facebook), Snapchat, Lyft,
Groupon, TripAdvisor, Nike, Levi Strauss, Ford, CBS, Comcast, News Corporation, and
Berkshire Hathaway among others) or triple-class (i.e., with multiple voting shares, ordinary and non-voting, such as Alphabet, Snap and Under Armour) with significantly high
multipliers, (i.e., with multiple voting shares of ten but also twenty times the ordinary
shares). On the reasons for the successful listing of these companies, which was deemed
“the most important issue in corporate governance today”, see John C. Coffee, Dual Class
Stock: The Shades of Sunset, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Nov. 19, 2018), https://perma.cc/MQ8VQNDE, and, for example, Bernard S. Sharfman, A Private Ordering Defense of a Company’s Right to Use Dual Class Share Structures in IPOs, 63 VILL. L. REV. 1, 3 (2018), and
Zohar Goshen & Assaf Hamdani, Corporate Control and Idiosyncratic Vision, 125 YALE L.
J. 560 (2015).
41 In particular, on the cross-border merger of Fiat Spa into its Dutch subsidiary Fiat
Investment N.V., which then took the name of Fiat Chrysler Automobiles N.V., see
Piergaetano Marchetti, Le fusion transfrontaliere del Gruppo Fiat-Chrysler, 59 RIV. SOC.
1124 (2014).
42 See infra Section IV.
43 The so-called Loi Florange (Loi 2014-384 du 29 mars 2014 visant à reconquérir
l’économie réelle [Law 2014-384 of March 14, 2014 on Aiming to Regain the Real
Economy], JOURNAL OFFICIEL ÉLECTRONIQUE AUTHENTIFIE [JORF] [OFFICIAL JOURNAL
OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC], Apr. 1, 2014, p. 11), approved as a result of the shut-down of
certain production units by Acelor-Mittal (including one, precisely, in Florange) modified
Article 225-L123 of the Code du commerce to provide that “(d)ans les sociétés dont les
actions sont admises aux négociations sur un marché réglementé, les droits de vote double
prévus au premier alinéa sont de droit, sauf clause contraire des statuts adoptée postérieurement à la promulgation de la loi n° 2014–384 du 29 mars 2014 visant à reconquérir
l’économie réelle, pour toutes les actions entièrement libérées pour lesquelles il est justifié
d’une inscription nominative depuis deux ans au nom du même actionnaire.” Thus, the
change that occurred in 2014 consisted of the transition from an opt-in regime to an opt-
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Other European legal systems have also taken their cue from
France and Italy, such as Belgium44 and, most recently, Spain.45
A similar phenomenon was experienced in Asia after the Alibaba
group chose to list in the United States, also thanks to a corporate
architecture capable of retaining control in the hands of the
founder of the world’s largest e-commerce platform.46 The reaction
of major Asian countries was swift, leading Singapore and Hong
Kong (respectively in 2017 and 2018) to allow deviation from the
“one share, one vote” rule and, therefore, the presence of listed
companies with multiple voting shares.47
This trend is still ongoing. Just to recall a European case, in
early 2021, following an initiative by the British Treasury
Minister, the UK Listing Review was released. The document, in
order to increase the attractiveness of the UK stock exchange for
the most innovative companies with high growth potential in the
complex post-Brexit scenario, also recommended, albeit with an
asymmetry, that “rules should be changed to allow dual class
share structures in the premium listing segment.”48
to an opt-out regime. As a result, the legislation now stipulates that all the French listed
companies’ shares potentially could double their voting rights, after a period of uninterrupted holding by the same shareholder, without prejudice to the decision of the general
shareholders’ meeting to opt out of this regime, which is therefore applicable by default.
44 The Loi 2019–222 du 23 mars 2019 de programmation 2018–2022 et de réforme
pour la justice [Law 2019–222 of March 23, 2019 of 2018–2022 Programming for Reform
and Justice], JOURNAL OFFICIEL ÉLECTRONIQUE AUTHENTIFIÉ [JORF] [OFFICIAL JOURNAL
OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC] March 24, 2019, p. 11 (introducing the new Code de sociétés et
des associations and stipulating the one share, one vote rule as the default rule (Article
7.51) and, more specifically, for unlisted and listed companies respectively, providing for
the possibility to derogate from the one share, one vote rule without any limitation (Article
7.52) and to issue tenure voting shares under a regulation that resembles the Italian one).
45 Also, the Ley 5/2021 about the “fomento de la implicación a largo plazo de los accionistas en las sociedades cotizadas” was introduced to govern shares with tenure voting
rights. Ley de Sociedades de Capital (B.O.E. 2021, 88) (Spain).
46 Cf. Jesse M. Fried & Ehud Kamar, Alibaba: A Case Study of Synthetic Control
(Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 533/2020, 2021),
https://perma.cc/FKJ8-G597 (explaining how the founder Jack Ma controls Alibaba as a
permanent member—through Ant Group—of a Partnership Committee which, in turn,
has a substantial weight within a Partnership that has the right to appoint most directors
of the listed company).
47 In China, the listing of companies with a dual-class structure is generally not permitted, except for certain exceptions on the ChiNext Market and for given types of companies. Among other things, following the Hong Kong stock exchange’s reform of listing
rules, Alibaba also decided to list on this stock exchange. See Robin Hui Huang et al., The
(Re)introduction of Dual-class Share Structures in Hong Kong: a Historical and Comparative Analysis, 20 J. CORP. L. STUD. 121 (2020).
48 JONATHAN HILL, UK LISTING REVIEW (Mar. 3, 2021), https://perma.cc/QPC5LH6W. It is well known that the London Stock Exchange rules allow companies with a
dual-class share structure to be listed in the standard segment, but not in the premium
segment, and this severely penalizes companies and investors as it does not allow them to
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In the context of a highly nuanced panorama that still
features notable exceptions, namely countries that do not allow
any deviation from the principle equalizing the power of influence
over the company and the amount of paid-in share capital,49 the
most recent studies show that around 45 percent of the main
western countries now allow companies to be listed with dual or
multi-share structures or to adopt shares with tenure voting
rights.50 In some cases, the listing of multiple voting stock
companies—precisely allowed to attract tech companies (or
companies with high growth potential) to the listing—comes with
various limits with respect to the multiplier, the resolutions to be
taken, the duration, or to specific circumstances which, if verified,
cause the loss of the voting rights’ multiplication.51
III. ITALY
The Italian corporate governance system is characterized by
a high degree of concentration of direct ownership, both for listed
and unlisted companies. Moreover, during the second half of the
20th century, the Italian stock market was known as one of the
European realms of control enhancing mechanisms, where a
shareholder owning the minority of shares could take advantage
of pyramid schemes, shareholder agreements, and nonvoting
share issuances to retain control over listed companies.52 In this
segment, and this severely penalizes companies and investors as it does not allow them to
be included in the main FTSE indices, such as the FTSE 100 and the FTSE 250. For an
in-depth comment on the constraints commonly proposed to be attached to dual-class
shares, which seem to be too rigid to prevent such measures from dissuading the very
same companies they wish to entice, see Bobby V. Reddy, Up the Hill and Down Again:
Constraining Dual-Class Shares, 80 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 515 (2021).
49 This is the case in Germany, which explicitly banned tenure voting shares in 1998.
See Aktiengesetz [AktG] [Stock Corporation Act], Sept. 6, 1965, BGBl. I at 1089, last
amended by Gesetz [G], BGBl. I at 2446, art. 9 (Ger.), https://perma.cc/HK89-HSU8.
50 Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., OECD Corporate Governance Factbook 2021
(2021), https://perma.cc/84CS-EXNM.
51 This is the case of the recent Singapore, Hong Kong, and Chinese regulations. See
M. Yan, The Myth of Dual Class Shares: Lessons from Asia’s Financial Centres, 21 J. CORP.
L. STUD. 397 (2021). The subject of sunset clauses is particularly studied by English-speaking scholars. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Kobi Kastiel, The Untenable Case for Perpetual Dual-Class Stock, 103 VA. L. REV. 585 (2017); Jill E. Fisch & Steven Davidoff Solomon,
The Problem of Sunsets, 99 BOS. U. L. REV. 1057 (2019); Marc T. Moore, Designing DualClass Sunsets: The Case for a Transfer-Centered Approach, 12 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV.
93 (2020). On the undesirability of a provision imposing a precise expiration date on the
duration of the multiple voting shares, see also Luca Enriques & Alessandro Romano, Rewiring Corporate Law for an Interconnected World 37 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Law
Working Paper No. 572/2021, 2022), https://perma.cc/7FN8-45AF.
52 See, e.g., Magda Bianco & Paola Casavola, Italian Corporate Governance: Effects
on Financial Structure and Firm Performance, 43 EUR. ECON. REV. 1057 (1999).
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scenario, characterized by a lack of confidence in the market
mechanisms of control, there was one exception, since—up until
recently (as the provision remained unchanged from the drafting
of the 1942 Civil Code)—the Italian legislature had always
prohibited multiple and/or tenure voting shares.
The hostility towards voting right enhancement instruments,
which were referred to as a real taboo in Italian corporate law,53
has only partially disappeared with the 2014 reform brought in
with the express purpose of enhancing the competitiveness of
Italian companies.54 The reform opened up the possibility of
issuing multiple voting shares only to unlisted joint-stock
companies, allowing listed companies to issue tenure voting
shares instead.
In particular, Art. 2351 of the Italian Civil Code now enables
unlisted joint-stock companies to provide for the creation of share
categories with multiple voting rights with a maximum of three
votes. However, it should be noted that, if these companies
subsequently intend to list on a regulated market, multiple voting
shares will retain their pre-listing rights. Therefore, if a company
wished to “armor” its pre-IPO majority in order to then collect
resources at the time of listing, it could already do so today,
preserving this structure after listing even in the event of a
subsequent share issuance.55
However, for previously listed companies, the law retained
the prohibition on issuing multiple voting shares.56 Nevertheless,
listed companies may introduce so-called tenure voting. Article
127 quinquies of the Consolidated Law on Finance permits up to
a maximum of two votes per share, owned by the same person for
an uninterrupted period of time longer than twenty-four months
commencing from the date of registration in a list that has to be
kept by the issuer.57

53

See Ventoruzzo, supra note 4.
See Legge 11 agosto 2014, n.116, G.U. Aug. 20, 2014, n.192 (It.).
55 Among public companies listed after 2014, only four issuers (Aquafil, Fila and
Guala, Philogen) introduced multiple voting class shares prior to listing and retained them
post-IPO.
56 The first paragraph of Article 127 sexies of the Consolidated Law on Finance provides that, as an exception to Article 2351, paragraph four, the listed companies’ bylaws
may not provide for the issuance of shares with multiple voting rights. Decreto legislativo
24 febbraio 1998, n. 58, G.U. Mar. 26, 1998, n.71 (It.).
57 In order to avoid excessive vote concentration, if a listing company issued multiple
voting shares, it cannot then issue tenure voting shares. On the use of loyalty shares in
Italy, see Chiara Mosca, Should Shareholders be Rewarded for Loyalty? European Experiments on the Wedge Between Tenured Voting and Takeover Law, 8 MICH. BUS. &
ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 245, 254 (2019).
54
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The scenario regarding the possible multiplication of voting
rights attributed to shares has been further enriched lately. First,
as part of the measures taken during the pandemic to boost
economic recovery, in 2020, the Government proposed to broaden
the possibility of issuing multiple voting shares to companies
previously listed on regulated markets.58 This proposal was
clearly affected by considerations pertaining to competition
between legal systems and, specifically, by the desire to hinder
the migration of certain Italian listed companies towards more
liberal systems as far as multiple voting shares are concerned.
Indeed, various foreign legal systems, both within and outside the
EU, allowed listed companies to depart from the one share one
vote rule by providing for categories of shares with multiple
voting rights. The prohibition for listed companies to issue shares
with multiple voting rights, established by Article 127 sexies of
the Consolidated Law on Finance, could thus have resulted in an
“unfair” misalignment between legal systems to the detriment of
the Italian stock market.59 The preamble to the bill also pointed
out that, in many cases, the decisions to relocate Italian
companies with shares listed on a regulated market abroad or to
opt for a foreign system for companies resulting from mergers
involving Italian listed companies, were also prompted by the
possibility of resorting to a legal regime conducive to the direct or
indirect provision of multiple voting shares.60
Given the possible risks of extracting private benefits that
the introduction of multiple voting shares could have raised,61 in
any event, certain safeguards were established in favor of
minority shareholders when adopting the resolution to issue
shares with multiple voting rights. In fact, the draft provided the
right of withdrawal for dissenting shareholders in the case of
approval of the resolution to implement multiple voting.
Moreover, it provided for the chance of blocking the resolution by
58 The original intention, which was never followed through, was to include it in Law
no. 77 of July 17, 2020, converting with amendments Decree-Law no. 34 of May 19, 2020.
See Legge 17 luglio 2020, n.77, G.U. July 18, 2020, n.180 (It.) (converting and amending
Decreto legge 19 maggio 2020, n.34, G.U. May 19, 2020, n.128 (It.)).
59 In reality, the international landscape shows that the possibility of issuing shares
with multiple voting rights, where envisaged, usually concerns companies that plan to
subsequently propose an initial public offering.
60 See the preamble to Article 45 of the draft “Relaunch Decree.” Draft of D.L. Rilancio (May 13, 2020), https://perma.cc/9RBM-ZPH7.
61 The same Report, however, judged these risks to be insignificant, to the extent
that the opening up to statutory autonomy and market valuations was justified in the
absence of proven negative effects that this multiple voting may generate for the companies that adopt it.
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the majority of the shareholders present at the general meeting,
other than the shareholder(s) who (even jointly) held a majority
(or relative majority) stake, provided that such dissenting votes
amount to at least 10 percent of the voting capital.
However, this proposal was not reflected in the final text of
the law due to possible constitutional breaches.62
The second reforming impulse is unexpectedly due, instead,
to the Italian Competition Authority, and this aspect is worth
further investigation because according to the conventional
wisdom, competition authorities should favor the market for
corporate control as one of the fundamental mechanisms that
could magnify efficiency and welfare.
A. The Italian Competition Authority and Its Peculiar Support
for the Issuing of Multiple Voting Shares by Listed
Corporations
The main task of the Italian Competition Authority (ICA) is
to enforce antitrust rules to protect competition in the market. In
addition, it should also promote competition by advising the
Government, Parliament, and regional entities on how to shape
and/or amend existing laws and regulations to increase existing
competition by lowering unnecessary barriers to entry,
discriminatory rules, or prohibitions that are not justified by
other general legitimate interests.63 The ICA can advise the
Government, Parliament, and regional and local bodies both on
existing laws and on draft legislation. In this context, the
authority can daily issue a general recommendation to the
Government and Parliament to amend or introduce laws and
regulations to foster market competition.
In March 2021, the ICA adopted a new recommendation64
suggesting several measures aimed at stimulating the
62 In all likelihood, the lack of transposition of Article 45 in the final text of the Decree-Law n. 34/2020 is due to the absence of significant links between the provision on
multiple voting shares and the objectives of the decree, containing urgent measures regarding health, support for work and the economy, and social policies linked to the epidemiological emergency caused by COVID-19.
63 See Legge 10 ottobre 1990, n. 287, at art. 21–24, G.U. Oct. 13, 1990, n. 240 (It.) (as
amended).
64 Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, proposte di riforma
concorrenziale, ai fini della legge annuale per il mercato e la concorrenza anno 2021 (Mar.
22, 2021), https://perma.cc/MZ4H-QCXW [hereinafter PROPOSTE DI RIFORMA 2021]. The
Antitrust Authority’s annual report and reports represent the basis for the Government’s
drafting of the annual bill for the market and competition (Art. 47, Law no. 99 of July 23,
2009). Other competitive reform proposals had been sent by the Authority in 2010, 2012,
2013, 2014.
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competitiveness of the Italian economic system and affecting the
governance models of Italian listed companies.65 In this context,
it proposed to allow the use of multiple voting shares by already
listed companies. According to the ICA, the ban on issuing
multiple voting shares for listed companies would represent an
undesirable limitation on the organization of economic activity,
prompting foreign companies not to locate their headquarters in
Italy and causing Italian companies to move abroad. The ban on
issuing multiple voting shares would therefore create a
competitive discrimination with respect to other jurisdictions’
companies, which are not subject to the same restrictions.66
According to the ICA, the reform, aimed at recreating a level
playing field (especially) in Europe, would not represent a race to
the bottom. On the contrary, by strengthening the stability of
control, multiple voting shares would incentivize a more attentive
management in a medium-long term perspective. In short, a more
open view towards issuing multiple voting shares by listed
companies would represent a philosopher’s stone to transform the
DNA of Italian companies and their objectives, while at the same
time attracting new capital and resources to the Italian financial
ecosystem from abroad.
In the past, in its role as a competition advocate, the ICA had
also dealt with corporate governance and financial markets, for
instance in relation to minority shareholdings and interlocking
directorates in the banking, insurance, and financial markets.67
However, the intervention in favor of the introduction of multiple
voting shares by listed companies is, at least at first glance,
difficult to frame in the ICA’s activity. The task of the authority
is to protect (and promote) competition, i.e., maintaining and
possibly fostering adequate competitive pressure on the relevant
product and geographic markets. Therefore, it appears that,
contrary to its mandate, the ICA supports the introduction of a
provision that does not foster the contestability of listed
companies, but that rather protects incumbent (private or public)

65

PROPOSTE DI RIFORMA 2021, supra note 64.
Proposte Di Riforma 2021, supra note 64.
67 Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, Proposte di riforma
concorrenziale ai fini della legge annuale per il mercato e la concorrenza 5 (Feb. 9, 2010),
https://perma.cc/G4YG-Y7GK. The Authority criticized the spread of shareholding and
personal links between competing operators and the independent directors, both of which
contribute to hindering the establishment of real competition in the final services markets.
The report then helped to urge the introduction of a ban on interlocking in the banking,
insurance, and financial sectors.
66
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shareholders.68 In a wider perspective, the ICA stance appears not
to be completely isolated: globalization; greater interconnection
between markets and companies; economic, financial and,
nowadays, social and health crises; and the substantial change in
the composition of the shareholders of large listed companies led
the ICA to rethink the “objectives” of company law and the
instruments for achieving them. In this context, and under
certain conditions, it has been stated, for example, that multiple
voting shares could misalign the objectives of the company with
those of institutional investors, who are more attuned to financial
strategies than to enduring corporate results.69
It is, therefore, interesting to look at the reasons invoked by
the ICA in relation to its proposal. On the one hand, the
unhinging of the one share one vote rule also depends on the
attempts of the various legal systems to encourage the listing of
companies with higher growth potential. On the other hand, the
ICA proposal seems not to have this purpose. Companies seeking
to list in Italy can already adopt categories of shares with
different voting rights (ordinary and limited voting shares,
multiple voting shares if included prior to the listing, or tenure
voting shares) to allow the founding shareholders to remain in
control of the company and, at the same time, open up to the risk
capital market. In addition, the proposal does not actually seem
to have the aim of stimulating a reform of company regulations
in the direction of greater private autonomy. Greater flexibility in
modulating voting rights could lead majority shareholders not to
inhibit growth and to instead strengthen operations on the
markets because of the possibility of losing the power to manage
the company.70 This would also be in line with the recent OECD
recommendation to the Italian government in its report on the

68 See Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113, 1126–27
(1998) (footnote omitted) (citation omitted) (“To begin, investors may be better protected
when dividend rights are tightly linked to voting rights, that is, when companies in a
country are subject to one-share–one-vote rules. When votes are tied to dividends, insiders
cannot have substantial control of the company without having substantial ownership of
its cash flows, which moderates their taste for (costly) diversion of cash flows relative to
payment of dividends.”).
69 Some interesting considerations and proposals on this matter are formulated in
Luca Enriques & Alessandro Romano, Rewiring Corporate Law for an Interconnected
World (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 572/2021, 2022),
https://perma.cc/7FN8-45AF.
70 For similar considerations, referring to the prohibition to list companies with dualclass structures in the Premium segment of the English stock exchange, see Bobby V.
Reddy, Finding the British Google: Relaxing the Prohibition of Dual-Class Stock from the
Premium-Tier of the London Stock Exchange, 79 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 315 (2020).
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Italian capital market: in short, greater flexibility in shaping
voting rights could make our capital markets more attractive and
make it easier for our listed companies to raise venture capital.
But this rationale is not reflected in the ICA’s reporting. In fact,
the ICA apparently confers on the multiple voting shares a
different objective, ascribing (also) to the lack of this option the
loss of competitiveness of Italian companies when compared to
those operating elsewhere. In short, Italian companies would be
affected by regulatory constraints that do not seem truly essential
and proportionate. This would result not only in unjustified costs,
but would even entail a competitive differential with respect to
companies not bound by the same limitations, since shares with
more votes, by reinforcing the stability of control, promote a
management that is more attentive to a medium-long term
perspective.
Now, the Authority clearly mixes plans that are not entirely
compatible, as will be clarified in the following paragraphs. In the
first place, the level of the attractiveness of our system as a choice
of seat by foreign enterprises is taken into consideration. From
this standpoint, company law is certainly one of the factors
considered when choosing to invest or locate an entrepreneurial
activity, even though the relevant elements and constraints that
keep foreign firms away from Italy appear to be quite different,
starting with fiscal and financial incentives and ending with
issues such as the slow pace of our judicial system, the burden of
bureaucracy, and the uncertainty of the general regulatory
framework.71 Secondly, there are the specific rules and incentives
or, vice versa, obstacles to listing. Costs and benefits are
distributed differently among players. In this sense, the presence
of categories of shares with multiple voting rights, which may
incentivize certain companies to be listed, could, at the same time,
be a strong disincentive for institutional investors, who should be
responsible for directing the resources allocated to company
growth. Finally, a third plan seems to merge with the reasoning

71 Some doubt may be cast on the reliability of the World Bank’s customary rankings
on the attractiveness of the various countries for entrepreneurial activity, but the data
emerging is very clear. Italy’s placing in these charts has always been rather low (in the
2020 edition of the publication, Italy dropped further to 58th place). What is noticeable,
however, is that the areas that significantly lower Italy’s ranking are related to bureaucracy (Italy is 98th in the field of ‘‘Starting a Business,” 97th in that of “Dealing with
Construction Permits,” and 128th in that of “Paying Taxes”) and the justice sector (in particular, Italy is 122nd in that of “Enforcing Contracts”). The report dedicated to Italy for
2020 is available at Doing Business: Italy, WORLD BANK (2020), https://perma.cc/XD6WNWUT.
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developed by the Authority; namely, the plan looks at multiple
voting shares as an instrument that is, if not strictly necessary,
at least appropriate for the purpose of reinforcing the stability of
control and providing an incentive for a management that is more
careful with a medium-long term perspective. This would allow
our companies to recover the competitiveness gap as compared to
other subjects which, instead, can (among other things) issue
categories of shares with multiple voting rights, facilitating
sustainable growth.72
The core of the reasoning of the Authority could therefore be
summarized as follows: multiple voting shares would make it
possible to steer the management of the company towards
medium/long-term objectives, stabilizing control and leading to
more solid and sustainable business growth.73 This would be
achieved by reinforcing control groups, but also by securing the
loyalty of other shareholders to the company and its business
plan. In other words, the tools for strengthening the vote would
represent an excellent antidote to short-termism, because they
would prompt managers and directors to look away from the stock
market price trend of the shares and from the claims of those who
speculate (in the short term). Multiple voting shares, by granting
greater administrative power to stable investors, would
encourage management to pursue forward-looking conduct, given
that their fate (and directors’ confirmation) would depend on
stable shareholders willing to hold on to their positions.74

72 Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., OECD Capital Market Review of Italy 2020:
Creating Growth Opportunities for Italian Companies and Savers (2020),
https://perma.cc/642Y-KWUX. The document states that “[r]eforms in this respect should
also consider efficiency gains with respect to the process and requirements for secondary
equity offerings by already-listed companies that, in addition to strengthening the balance
sheets of individual companies, also will lead to higher free-float ratios and help attract
the growing pool of capital from global institutional investors. In this context, policy makers may consider taking steps to stimulate an increase in the free-float by allowing more
flexible structures of voting rights to address concerns among founders and long-term
shareholders about the effectiveness of decisions that are of key importance to the future
direction of the company, without compromising safeguards for minority shareholder protection. This may include an evaluation of the effectiveness, and possible unintended consequences for the free-float, that may arise from supermajority requirements for certain
decisions by the shareholder meeting. It may also include a more flexible default framework for deciding on the introduction of loyalty shares.” Id.
73 PROPOSTE DI RIFORMA 2021, supra note 64.
74 Furthermore, it has never been empirically or definitively demonstrated that longterm management is always preferable. See Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for Favoring
Long-term Shareholders, 124 YALE L.J. 1554 (2015). On a different level, see Mark Roe &
Roy Shapira, The Power of the Normative in Corporate Lawmaking 13 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 554/2020, 2020), https://perma.cc/Z6TG-RS4G
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Moreover, the issuance of such shares could lend itself to
encouraging new investments when current shareholders are
unable to cope with new capitalization on their own. Shareholders
who currently control the company could dilute their ownership
without the risk of losing corporate control if provided with
multiple voting shares.75
Lastly, several hints that lie in the background in the
document could suggest that the ICA, if not directly promoting
protective measures, was not against the introduction of such
measures for the Italian entrepreneurial system, especially
during a period of weakness due to the economic and health crisis.
In this sense, we could read the statement according to which
multiple voting shares could lead to the strengthening or,
anyhow, to the preservation of management power in the hands
of leading shareholders, avoiding their escape abroad in the
search for more protective regimes. On the other hand, the history
of multiple voting shares teaches that these tools have been
introduced and used in times of crisis with the aim of protecting
national companies.
At the moment, the proposals of the Authority have not been
adopted by the Government and the Parliament. However, on a
theoretical and empirical level, the interest in assessing whether
or not the reasons supporting the introduction of multiple voting
shares by already listed companies are well-founded.
IV. MULTIPLE VOTING SHARES AND COMPETITION AMONG
JURISDICTIONS: COMPETITION AMONG JURISDICTIONS,
COMPETITIVENESS, OR CORPORATE SUSTAINABILITY?
Emblematically, in Italy, the issue of the introduction of
multiple voting shares was raised by the Antitrust Authority with
the aim of calling on lawmakers to reconsider their closed-minded
(considering the negative connotation of short-termism “rooted in deep-seated cultural
norms” to be valued as a matter more of narrative than of substance).
75 In the Report, the Authority states its awareness of the numerous criticisms
against the introduction of multiple voting share classes; however, it deems these criticisms to be overridable in light of a comparison with other existing and widely used mechanisms for strengthening control, that are both less verifiable and less transparent. In
fact, the improvement of this multiple voting tool should be accompanied by the introduction of “adequate control mechanisms, implemented also through concrete and effective
information to the markets on the ownership structures and business plans of the companies.” PROPOSTE DI RIFORMA 2021, supra note 64. This Article does not propose to discuss
these objections in depth, but it should be pointed out that the replacement effect of multiple voting tools with respect to other control-enhancing mechanisms is not to be taken
for granted, and it could even be the case that such mechanisms are strengthened (e.g.,
shareholders’ agreements among owners of unlisted multiple voting shares).
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the aim of calling on lawmakers to reconsider their closed-minded
attitude towards this tool. As is natural for an antitrust authority,
it focused on the need to overcome the risks of forum shopping to
the detriment of the country’s competitiveness. In order to
approach this issue, it is essential to ponder the needs behind this
reform. As already noted, the overturning of the “one share, one
vote” principle is driven by the desire to encourage the listing of
firms with higher growth potential in Europe. This implies an
evaluation of the inadequacy of the current rules given that
companies wishing to be listed in Italy (as in other EU countries)
already have the possibility of introducing share categories with
different voting rights (common shares and shares with limited
voting rights, shares with multiple voting rights if included prior
to listing, or loyalty shares).
However, if we think in terms of competition among legal
systems, there are many corporate law mechanisms to bear in
mind, such as the extent of the multiplying factors with which to
equip shares and any possible rewarding systems for shareholder
loyalty, the possibility of listing all categories of shares (either
multiple-voting shares or not), and the regulatory implications of
mandatory takeover bids.
Such a reform—especially if undertaken by individual
Member States and not at the EU level—would clearly require
the needed safeguards in favor of minority shareholders, which
must be consistent with the company law systems concerned. In
this case, the same attention must be paid to the harmonization
of the rules as a whole so that the game plan is truly aligned. The
point we are trying to make is that the discussion cannot be
limited to introducing multiple voting shares or not: if the
European debate involves competition among legal systems, then
the elements that contribute to enlivening such competition have
to be examined one-by-one. We should just recall that the debate
has gained momentum in Italy in the wake of the relocation of
some listed companies to the Netherlands, where they adopted
multiple voting shares with high multipliers.
Thus, two different viewpoints arise. On the one hand, there
is a need to strengthen the growth of companies and their access
to the market, which can be examined at both the Member State
and EU levels.76 On the other hand, competition among
jurisdictions, which is limited, instead, to the goal of enhancing
76 Consider, similarly, the considerations—referring to the ban on listing companies
with dual class structures in the premium segment of the UK stock exchange—by Reddy,
supra note 70.
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the attractiveness of an individual Member State within the EU
(although there has been no lack of cases of companies choosing
the US as their listing market in recent years). The recent OECD
recommendation to our government for greater flexibility in the
shaping of voting rights could make our capital markets more
attractive and ease the raising of risk capital for our listed
companies.77
The Italian Antitrust Authority’s perspective is, as
mentioned above, aimed at highlighting the second approach, i.e.
the appropriateness for Italy to increase flexibility with respect to
the multiple voting shares scenario. In fact, the Authority has
even managed to attach the lack of this option to the loss of
competitiveness of Italian companies compared to foreign ones
because Italian companies would be suffering from regulatory
constraints that are not truly essential and proportionate. The
strong underlying assumption is that multiple voting shares,
which reinforce the stability of control, encourage management to
pay more attention to the medium-long term outlook.
In our view, it is also necessary to assess whether the
multiple voting mechanism is welcomed by institutional investors
since they play a major role in providing companies with
resources for growth. Finally, the Authority views multiple voting
shares as an appropriate tool for reinforcing the stability of
control, encouraging management to pay more attention to a
medium-long term horizon. This is why we deem it relevant to
compare this statement with the current ownership structures of
Italian companies.
V. IN FAVOR OF MULTIPLE VOTING SHARES: INCENTIVES FROM
ENHANCING CONTROL AND RAISING CAPITAL
Expressing support for multiple voting shares implies
substantial acceptance of them as tools for enhancing control.
77 ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 72, at 19 (“[R]eforms in this
respect should also consider efficiency gains with respect to the process and requirements
for secondary equity offerings by already-listed companies that, in addition to strengthening the balance sheets of individual companies, also will lead to higher free-float ratios
and help attract the growing pool of capital from global institutional investors. In this
context, policy makers may consider taking steps to stimulate an increase in the free-float
by allowing more flexible structures of voting rights to address concerns among founders
and long-term shareholders about the effectiveness of decisions that are of key importance
to the future direction of the company, without compromising safeguards for minority
shareholder protection. This may include an evaluation of the effectiveness, and possible
unintended consequences for the free-float, that may arise from supermajority requirements for certain decisions by the shareholder meeting. It may also include a more flexible
default framework for deciding on the introduction of loyalty shares.”).
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Supporting multiple voting shares implies considering them as an
accepted tool of enhancing control. Multiple voting shares would
in fact make it possible to steer the management towards
medium/long-term results, stabilizing control and allowing for
more robust and sustainable corporate growth.78 This happens not
only by reinforcing the control groups, but also by fostering the
loyalty of other shareholders to the company and its business
plan. From this angle, vote-strengthening tools are an antidote to
short-termism as they encourage managers and directors to
divert their gaze from share price movements and the claims of
speculative (short-term) investors. By giving greater power to
stable investors, multiple voting shares encourage managers to
pursue forward-looking policies, given that their confirmation as
such (i.e. the length of their tenure) depends on the shareholders’
willingness to stay with the firm.79
Meanwhile, the issuance of multiple voting shares can
encourage the flow of additional capital when owners are unable
to cope with new capitalization. They may agree to dilute their
shareholding without the risk of losing control of the company.80
Furthermore, some allusions that are not too far beneath the
surface in the Antitrust Authority document may suggest that the
introduction of multiple voting shares could help with protecting
Italian listed firms from hostile takeovers from abroad during a
period of particular share price weakness due to a persistent
economic crisis. This is how one might read the assertion that, at
least in the context of the rather small number of non-controlled
listed companies, multiple voting shares could assist in
strengthening the power of major industrial shareholders over
short-term funds, nipping in the bud the temptation to leave Italy
in search of more protective regimes.
Lastly, initially in France (but also in Italy when the tenured
voting mechanism was introduced), it was argued that the
possibility of having multiple voting shares allows the public
shareholders to sell (further) tranches of shareholdings and thus
raise cash without reducing the State’s control over companies.
78

Proposte Di Riforma 2021, supra note 64.
Moreover, it has never been empirically and conclusively shown that long-term
management is to be preferred over short-term management. See Fried, supra note 74; see
also Roe & Shapira, supra note 74, at 13 (considering the negative connotation of shorttermism “rooted in deep-seated cultural norms” to be evaluated as a matter of narrative
rather than substance).
80 In the Report, the Antitrust Authority expresses its awareness regarding the numerous criticisms leveled at the introduction of multiple-voting share classes but considers
these objections to be surmountable. See discussion supra note 75.
79

186

The University of Chicago Business Law Review

[Vol. 1:157

From a protectionist point of view, multiple voting shares can also
represent a less intrusive instrument than the “golden power”
(namely, that power the Italian government has to impose
conditions on, or even veto, investments by foreign persons in
Italian companies and assets in strategic sectors in case this
might jeopardize national security or public interests) to avoid
foreign raiders’ acquisitions.
VI. SOME MORE CONCRETE REASONING—ON THE STABILIZATION
OF OWNERSHIP STRUCTURES WHERE COMPANIES WITH
CONCENTRATED OWNERSHIP OR TENDING TO DO SO PREVAIL
Oftentimes, the validity of theoretical arguments is not
matched by the desired concrete outcome. For this reason, we
wish to try to compare the hypothetical benefits discussed in the
preceding paragraphs with the actual scenario of Italian listed
companies.
The theory that listed companies are marked by unstable
ownership structures, which leads directors to privilege shortterm objectives, induced by the strong pressure exerted by
institutional investors,81 should now be verified.82 Actually, even
the latter statement is inaccurate insofar as it discounts a
uniform view of institutional investors; it is worth thinking, for
example, that index funds—which widely invest in Italian
companies83—cannot easily dispose of the shares included in the
indices, so their perspective is not a short-term one.84 More
generally, in Italy all institutional investors have a lower
presence than in Anglo-Saxon countries. A recent OECD study
shows that in 2018 the presence of institutional investors in
Italian listed companies (26.9%) was less than half the rate
registered in the UK (61%) and the US (70.9%).

81 This concern is expressed in Recital 15 of the Directive 2017/828, of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2017 amending Directive 2007/36/EC as regards
the encouragement of long-term shareholder engagement.
82 Giovanni Strampelli, Can BlackRock Save the Planet? The Institutional Investors’
Role in Stakeholder Capitalism, 11 HARV. BUS. L. REV. (2021).
83 See the section of Consob’s institutional website dedicated to the communications
received with regard to significant shareholdings. Società Quotate – Azionariati Attuali
[Listed Companies –Current Shareholders], Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la
Borsa, https://perma.cc/26XS-XYYN (last visited Feb. 7, 2022).
84 Giovanni Strampelli, Are Passive Index Funds Active Owners? Corporate Governance Consequences of Passive Investing, 55 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 803 (2018).
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Table 1. Average shareholder composition by different categories
of investors, weighted by market capitalization, end-2018.

Italy
Finland
France
Germany
Norway
Spain
Sweden
Canada*
China*
Japan*
UK*
USAs*

Private
corp.

Public
sector

Strategic Institution Other,
individuals al
free-float
investors

13.5%
6.7%
16.1%
18.4%
8.4%
10.2%
12.9%
6.7%
10.9%
22.8%
5.0%
3.0%

12.0%
12.9%
7.8%
5.9%
33.9%
6.3%
6.3%
3.7%
38.8%
4.8%
6.8%
3.1%

11.0%
6.6%
12.6%
8.0%
8.1%
13.6%
10.8%
2.5%
12.7%
4.2%
2.6%
4.2%

26.9%
32.1%
27.5%
28.3%
23.1%
26.5%
38.3%
46.7%
8.8%
27.2%
61.0%
70.9%

36.6%
41.7%
36.1%
39.3%
26.6%
43.4%
31.7%
40.5%
28.7%
41.0%
24.6%
18.9%

Source: OECD, OECD Capital Market Review of Italy - Creating
Growth Opportunities for Italian Companies and Savers, OECD
Capital Market Series, 2020.
Recent data processed by Consob confirm those published by
the OECD. In the latest Corporate Governance report, an
increase in the presence of institutional investors in 2019
compared to 2018 was pointed out,85 but when looking at the tenyear trend (Table 2) the average percentage of capital held by
institutional investors is steadily around 26–31 percent.

85 Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa, Rapporto Consob sulla corporate
governance delle società quotate italiane 2020, at 16 (2021).
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Table 2. Percentage of capital and number of listed companies
with institutional investors

Italy
Finland
France
Germany
Norway
Spain
Sweden
Canada*
China*
Japan*
UK*
USAs*

Private
corp.

Public
sector

Strategic Institution Other,
individuals al
free-float
investors

13.5%
6.7%
16.1%
18.4%
8.4%
10.2%
12.9%
6.7%
10.9%
22.8%
5.0%
3.0%

12.0%
12.9%
7.8%
5.9%
33.9%
6.3%
6.3%
3.7%
38.8%
4.8%
6.8%
3.1%

11.0%
6.6%
12.6%
8.0%
8.1%
13.6%
10.8%
2.5%
12.7%
4.2%
2.6%
4.2%

26.9%
32.1%
27.5%
28.3%
23.1%
26.5%
38.3%
46.7%
8.8%
27.2%
61.0%
70.9%

36.6%
41.7%
36.1%
39.3%
26.6%
43.4%
31.7%
40.5%
28.7%
41.0%
24.6%
18.9%

Source: Consob Report on Corporate Governance of Italian Listed
Companies 2020.
The hypothesis of instability in the ownership structure
clearly clashes with Consob’s data showing that at the end of
2019, out of 228 companies based in Italy listed on the regulated
market managed by Borsa Italiana, the vast majority (196 out of
228) were controlled by one or more shareholders. In particular,
115 firms were controlled by a single shareholder owning more
than half of the votes that can be exercised in the general
shareholders meeting (de jure control); fifty-seven were controlled
by a single shareholder that, although owning less than 50% of
the votes, was able to exercise a decisive influence over the
decisions of the general shareholders meeting (de facto control),
and, finally, twenty-four were controlled by a coalition of
shareholders linked by shareholders’ agreements.86
We replicated the exercise with data as of June 22, 2021,87
and ended up finding that the numbers and percentages do not

86

Id. at 8.
Specifically, we used data available on Consob’s website, in the section on listed
issuers, about current shareholdings. Società Quotate [Listed Companies], COMMISSIONE
87
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differ significantly from those of 2018. Out of the 225 Italian listed
companies, as many as 127 are controlled de jure and seventyfour are controlled de facto (by a single shareholder or through a
coalition). Only twenty-four listed companies can thus be
classified as widely held firms (not subject to dominant influence
by one or more shareholders).
However, in Italy some companies, including some of the
main Italian banks (Unicredit, Intesa San Paolo, Mediobanca),
and other companies with high capitalization, such as
Assicurazioni Generali, Telecom and Prysmian, have a more
dispersed shareholder base. The absence of a shareholder
exercising a dominant influence does not always imply the
exclusive presence of funds and other institutional investors.
Among the twenty-four listed companies without a controlling
shareholder,88 only seven are prevalently represented by institutional investors; in the other cases, the relevant shareholders are
individuals—usually, but not necessarily, the founders—or public
investors, banking foundations, banks, and industrial partners.
Therefore, these shareholders cannot necessarily be considered, a
priori, as affected by short-term prospects.
It is possible to deepen the analysis by questioning the stability of control. As is well known, companies subject to de facto
control (and, even more so, those without controlling subjects)
could be more prone to interference by more activist shareholders
(such as institutional investors) moved by short-term ambitions.
But, as already noted, this is a hypothesis that is not easy to verify empirically. However, it is quite conceivable to develop a few
categories by listing companies into three groups: legally controlled companies, de facto controlled companies, and non-controlled companies.
The first group, which is the largest, is populated by legal
subsidiaries, which tend to be less affected by the concerns of minority shareholders. In contrast, at the opposite extreme there
are companies that are not controlled de jure or de facto, even
though—as noted—sometimes there are groups of stable shareholders (founders, industrial partners, financing banks). For
those companies belonging to this subset, at least in some cases
(for example, in the absence of key shareholders) multiple voting
shares could—hypothetically—bolster management stability. By
contrast, in the case of public companies, the effect of multiple
NAZIONALE PER LE SOCIETÀ E LA BORSA, https://perma.cc/C2RW-LZRU (last visited Feb.
15, 2022).
88 All data (as of June 22, 2021) have been extracted as detailed above.
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voting shares would be nearly neutral, given that, by definition,
there would be no “stable” shareholders whose participation could
be consolidated through the issuance of multiple voting class
shares.
VII. HOW TO INTRODUCE MULTIPLE VOTING SHARES: CORPORATE
LAW ISSUES
Reform hypotheses frequently clash with corporate law issues. How is it possible to achieve the purpose of reinforcing the
role of stable shareholders only by introducing multiple voting
share categories in listed companies without compromising the
protection of minority shareholders?
In the Italian and EU literature, there are three generallyrecognized cornerstones of minority shareholder protection: the
pre-emptive right, the withdrawal right, and the white-wash
mechanism.
The first means of protecting minorities envisages that in a
share issuance, newly issued shares are offered to all shareholders. In the event of the issuance of shares with multiple voting
rights, there could be a proportional distribution to all shareholders, leaving the relative percentages of voting rights unchanged.
In such a scenario, there seems to be no strong incentive to use
the instrument, which cannot offer a guaranteed outcome of
strengthening the majority shareholder. However, corrective
measures may be devised, such as, for example, the exclusion of
newly issued multiple voting shares from listing.89 However, the
resolution for the increase and/or conversion must be approved in
the special general shareholder meeting, where the majority of
shareholders could object to the introduction of exceptions to the
one share one vote rule.
The second tool for protecting minority shareholders that
could be invoked in response to a resolution to issue shares with
multiple votes is the right of withdrawal, which would entail, following the share issuance, the need to liquidate the shareholders
requesting exit. It should also be noted that the issuance of

89 Moreover, one could think of a resolution to issue shares without pre-emptive
rights in favor of stable shareholders only because the interest of the company requires it,
even though in such circumstances the company’s reason for excluding other shareholders
from participating in the share issuance is not immediate. In addition, one could hypothesize the consolidation of the loyalty bonus consisting in the enhanced vote for the shares
due to the shareholders benefiting from the double voting rights. So, although deferred in
time and in compliance with equal treatment, multiple voting rights would become a
steady component of the power structure of the listed company.
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multiple voting shares can lead to a reduction in the value of common shares, which has already been observed with regard to savings shares.90
Finally, yet importantly, comes the regulation of takeover
bids. In the European context, in the hypothesis of a successful
share issuance of multiple voting shares largely subscribed to by
the leading shareholders, there is no reason to believe that the
regulation of compulsory takeover bids does not apply when
thresholds are exceeded, just as is the case with the increase in
voting rights provided for by Article 127 quinquies of the Consolidated Law on Finance.91 Therefore, either the reinforcement due
to the issuance of multiple voting shares is contained within the
limits allowed by the takeover regulations, or alternatively the
cost associated with the strengthening of control could be so high
as to make this option unfeasible.
In this sense, the adoption of tenure voting by listed companies, introduced by the 2014 reform, is exemplary. As of June 22,
2021, there are sixty-eight listed companies whose bylaws provide
for tenure voting rights, representing approximately 30% of the
listed companies. These are mostly family-owned and medium-tosmall companies; only four of them are included in the FTSE Mib
index,92 and the first in terms of capitalization is Amplifon, currently ranked as the 20th in that index.93 However, for our purposes, the most relevant data is that out of the sixty-eight listed
companies whose bylaws allow for the increase in voting rights,
fifty-two are de jure controlled, ten by shareholder agreements
that group together more than half of the voting rights, and two
by the very same family that, considering each shareholding portion, jointly accounts for more than half of the voting rights.
Therefore, sixty-four out of sixty-eight (over 94% of companies)
90 See Luigi Zingales, The Value of the Voting Right: A Study of the Milan Stock Exchange Experience, 7 REV. FIN. STUD. 125 (1994).
91 In the hypothesis of a share issuance in which the shareholder exercises the preemptive rights to which she is entitled, but nevertheless finds herself exceeding the offer
thresholds, the application of the exemption from the duty to make a bid for the entire
share capital cannot always be taken for granted due to causes beyond the control of the
offeror. Cf. Chiara Mosca, Le opa obbligatorie, in 2 IL TESTO UNICO FINANZIARIO: MERCATI
ED EMITTENTI 1441 (Mario Cera & Gaetano Presti eds., 2019); Letter from Luigi Spaventa,
President, Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa (June 28, 2002) (It.),
https://perma.cc/5B6C-6TBF; Letter from Giuseppe Vegas, President, Commissione
Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa, to Istituto Ligure Mobiliare S.p.A. et al. (Mar. 16,
2011) (It.), https://perma.cc/MRN6-XKL7.
92 This is the case of the following companies: Amplifon, Diasorin, Hera and Unipol
Gruppo.
93 Capitalisation
FTSE MIB Basket on 31.05.2021, BORSA ITALIANA,
https://perma.cc/38P4-MJ8Y (last visited Feb. 7, 2022).
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are subject to de jure control and are, hence, stable by definition.
As for the remaining four issuers, all these are de facto controlled
companies (in one case through a shareholder agreement), whose
first shareholder holds more than 30% of the capital.94 What
needs to be underlined is that, for the sixty-four firms who have
adopted the voting enhancement system, the subsequent increases following the implementation of the double vote (often
such as to allow a majority to be held in the company’s special
shareholder meetings as well) cannot entail any duty to launch
an offer, since the initial shareholding of the parent company is
already above the threshold—in other words, over the absolute
majority of voting rights.95
These are the issuers whose shareholders have been able to
benefit from a (further) strengthening of power due to the presence of tenure voting shares; a strengthening that does not seem
to have been used for the purpose of further growth, not even
through an expansion of the shareholding structure, but to rather
allow a diversification of the financial portfolio by the parent companies.96 All the other companies (with de facto control or without
a controlling party or coalition) have not, at least up to now, contemplated amending their bylaws to allow for tenure voting
rights. In these cases, proposals have not been taken into consideration because of the real danger of rejection by the special general shareholder meeting,97 or because of the said risks of incurring the obligation of a full takeover bid once the increase in
voting rights has accrued.

94 Under Italian law, a takeover bid must be launched by anyone holding more than
30% of the capital of a listed company.
95 Mosca, supra note 57, at 270.
96 Emanuele Bajo et al., Bolstering Family Control: Evidence from Loyalty Shares, J.
CORP. FIN. 1, 16 (2020) (arguing that families use loyalty shares to further reinforce their
position in the company and then divest part of the shares—while retaining control—to
diversify their portfolio and mitigate the idiosyncratic risk, and reaching the conclusion
that the only outcome of the shares with tenure voting rights was to further strengthen
the shareholders already in a position of control); cf. Mark J. Roe & Federico Cenzi
Venezze, Will Loyalty Shares Do Much for Corporate Short-Termism?, 76 BUS. LAW. 467,
484 (2021).
97 Not coincidentally, some proxy advisors had advised their clients to vote against
resolutions relating to amendments to the bylaws aimed at introducing tenure voting in
the general shareholder meetings of listed companies. This recommendation could have
influenced precisely those companies whose ownership structures are less concentrated.
See Reddy, supra note 70.
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VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
If they were brought up to date, even Easterbrook and
Fischel—and we believe it is highly likely—would take more open
views than the (perhaps only ideal) paradigm of perfect shareholder democracy they formulated. They would certainly have
taken an active role in the discussion about the possible effects of
introducing multiple-vote shares, which for many years has been
an evergreen in the corporate law literature of both the United
States and Europe (and not just of the European Union, as shown
by the latest British updates and discussions).
On the one hand, the possible consequences in terms of contestability, excessive disproportion between risk and management power, and the extraction of private benefits, led scholars to
view the possible introduction of multiple-vote shares with particular skepticism. In light of the typical shareholder concentration of Italian listed companies, the intrinsic weakness of the national market, and the existence of many other tools for the
protection of incumbents made available following the 2008 crisis,
the introduction of multiple voting shares would indeed risk
transforming our market into a petrified forest.
On the other hand, multiple voting shares can also create
beneficial effects, like favoring the growth of companies and gathering of risk capital on the markets of highly innovative companies, thereby allowing founders to retain control beyond the listing.98
The fact is, nevertheless, that the Report of the Antitrust Authority concerns companies that are already listed and does not,
hence, appear to be geared towards achieving said benefits. Moreover, it does not mention reasons linked to the necessity of widening the room for private autonomy in adjusting shareholder
rights, ensuring the necessary degree of protection for minority
shareholders, in order to incentivize companies to further differentiate financial instruments to cover their risk capital needs.
The reasons that the report provides for the introduction of multiple-vote shares are manifold and concern, rather, the attempt to
pursue sustainable growth in the long term, stabilizing control,
and linking shareholders more closely to the company’s plans.
The fears that seem to underlie the proposal (instability of control, high percentage of short-term shareholders) do not seem to

98 This incentive could be important, more generally, for small and medium-sized
Italian companies, which would thus find, especially during times of liquidity crisis, alternative financing instruments to the banking system.
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be justified, but should they ever become so in the near future, in
the existence of the usual instruments for safeguarding minority
shareholders (option rights, reinforced majorities, regulations
governing the takeover bid), a review of the current regulations
aimed at permitting the issue of shares with multiple voting
rights for listed companies would not always be feasible.
Finally, other perspectives (which cannot, of course, be referred to the Report of the Antitrust Authority) see multi-voting
shares as a tool at the disposal of controlling shareholders and
incumbents to keep a firm grip on their control and avoid the risk
of takeovers without adding any economic or financial cost on
their part. In other words, contestability and the market would
be immolated on the altar of the protection of Italian listed companies. This result could only be achieved by sacrificing, or rather
temporarily annulling, the rights of minority shareholders. And
it is perhaps not excessive to predict that, if this were the case,
the loss of investor confidence in our market would outweigh the
potential benefits.

